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THE KENTUCKY RAPE SHIELD LAW: ONE STEP
TOO FAR*
The principles governing the conduct of rape trials are at
least partly grounded in the fear that false charges are fre-
quently made in such cases.' Matthew Hale, once Lord Chief
Justice of England, said that rape "is an accusation easily to
be made and hard to be proved, hnd harder to be defended by
the party accused, tho never so innocent."' 2 More recently, Wig-
more connected chastity and veracity in rape cases, again due
to an overwhelming potential for false charges.,
The fundamental fear that women will "cry rape" is rooted
in Biblical notions of female vengeance4 and in psychological
propositions that women frequently fantasize about rape.
Adopting the views of Hale and Wigmore, courts have typically
presumed that the danger of falsification exists in all rape
cases.' As a result, courts have traditionally demanded three
* The author is grateful to Robert G. Lawson, Professor of Evidence and Criminal
Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, for his encouragement and helpful criti-
cism.
I S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 21-22, 676-78 (1975); IA J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 924a (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
2 People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 254, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 126 (1975)
(quoting 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (lst Am. ed. 1847)). In
this case, the California Supreme Court repudiated the need for the following manda-
tory jury instruction, based on Hale's words:
A charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is one
which is easily made and, once made, difficult to defend against, even if the
person accused is innocent.
Therefore, the law requires that you examine the testimony of the fe-
male person named in the information with caution.
Id. at 252, 123 Cal Rptr. at 124. The court reasoned that such an instruction is obsolete,
due to the maturation of due process concepts in criminal law and to the empirical
data on rape. Cf. Holland v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.2d 459, 459 (Ky. 1954) ("Cases
of this kind are so easily charged and difficult to disprove ...."); Neace v. Common-
wealth, 62 S.W. 733, 734 (Ky. 1901) (in which the Court explicitly repeated Hale's
warning).
3J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 924a. Wigmore even advocated a compulsory
psychiatric examination for the complainant in all rape cases. See also Mosley v.
Commonwealth, 420 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1967).
S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 21-22.
Id. at 311-22; J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 924a. Contra, People v. Rincon-
Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal Rptr. 119 (1975).
1 See Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 S.W.2d 679, 680-81 (Ky. 1967), in which the
Court ignored the danger of falsification in that particular case, based on the testimony
of the complainant's psychiatrist; rather, reference was made to the existence of that
danger in sex offense cases in general.
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types of evidence in rape trials: proof of resistance or force,7
corroboration of the complainant's charge,8 and admission of
evidence of the complainant's sexual activity prior to the al-
leged rape.' The third of these has prompted widespread dis-
cussion and legislative action. The use of this "chastity evi-
dence" in rape trials must be examined to understand the rea-
sons underlying recent changes in rape laws. 0
As a preliminary matter, the reader should be aware that
the danger of falsification does not exist in all cases. The dan-
ger is indeed real at a pretrial stage, as evidenced by the 15
percent of all reported rapes which prove to be unfounded."
However, the police practice of "founding" rape reports'2
should sufficiently reduce the number of rape trials so that
courts will at least question whether a danger of falsification
does indeed exist in a particular trial situation. At any rate, if
chastity evidence is to be admitted in rape trials because of a
fear of false charges, the threshold question of whether that
hazard does exist should not be dismissed so readily.'"
However, it must be emphasized that despite claims to the
7 This requirement has never existed in Kentucky. However, in Bowman v. Com-
monwealth, 143 S.W. 47, 53 (Ky. 1912), while refusing to impose this standard, the
Court noted that the lack of outcry or resistance was "difficult to understand and
harmonize."
See generally S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 366-68, for an account of the
manifestation of this corroboration requirement in the incipient stages of a rape prose-
cution. "Founding" is the term assigned to the preliminary investigation of the alleged
rape by the police. This routine practice includes questioning the complainant in
detail, perhaps more than once, to assess the validity of her account. Factors which
prompt the "unfounding" of a rape report include: too much time between rape and
report; insufficient evidence alone; lack of victim corroboration alone; and a combina-
tion of the second and third factors. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION & U. S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE, Police Volume I at 18 (1977).
1 FED. R. EVID. 404 (a) (2).
10 See generally Lichtenstein, Rape Laws Undergoing Changes to Aid Victims,
N.Y. Times, June 4, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 2.
11 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 24 (1975).
12 See note 8 supra.
13 A notable exception to the general failure of courts to reassess the basic fear of
falsification is People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975). Hav-
ing examined the bases for Matthew Hale's words, and the context in which they were
uttered, the court declared: "[W]e find nothing in Hale's writings to suggest that, as
a matter of course, juries should be instructed that those who claim to be victims of
sexual offenses are presumptively entitled to less credence than those who testify as
the alleged victims of other crimes." Id. at 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
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contrary, a rape victim is not the only victim of a crime whose
character may be in issue at trial. Character evidence may also
be introduced about the victim in a homicide case, when the
defendant claims that he killed in self defense, in order to
prove that the victim was the aggressor." Other arguments for
and against the use of chastity evidence in rape trials have
similar deficiencies, which this Comment will demonstrate.
I. BACKGROUND: THE CLAMOR FOR REFORM
The use of chastity evidence in rape trials should be gov-
erned by evidence law. The fundamental evidence admissibil-
ity requirements are materiality 5 and relevancy.'" Even if both
of these prerequisites are satisfied, however, evidence may be
excluded for "auxiliary policy reasons.' ' ' 7 Although not all of
the arguments against the use of chastity evidence have been
presented in terms of evidence law, this Comment will examine
them in that context.
Fundamental evidence admissibility requirements de-
mand first that evidence be submitted to prove a material
element of the case;" second, the'offer of proof must be relevant
to the ultimate fact toward which it is directed.'9 In rape cases,
said Wigmore, consent is "a material element; and the charac-
ter of the woman as to chastity is of considerable probative
value in judging of the likelihood of that consent."20 Wigmore
said, in effect, that chastity evidence is always relevant to
prove consent, which is always material in a rape prosecution.
Such evidence should be admitted, he further argued, even in
cases where consent is not an issue, "not because it is logically
relevant. . ., but because a certain type of feminine character
FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (2); C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 193 (2d ed. 1972).
In the courtroom the terms relevancy and materiality are often used
interchangeably, but materiality in its more precise meaning looks to the
relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the
issues in the case [citations]. If the evidence is offered to prove a proposition
which is not a matter in issue or probative of a matter in issue, the evidence
is properly said to be immaterial.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at § 185.
I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 9 (3d ed. 1940).
,7 See notes 37-40 infra and accompanying text.
' C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at § 185.
" J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, at § 9.
Id. § 62 at 464.
[Vol. 66
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predisposes to imaginary or false charges."' 2' In those cases,
Wigmore seems to have said, the danger of false charges is
material, and chastity evidence is relevant proof of whether the
rape charge is false.
Despite Wigmore's opinions having been based on psychol-
ogical authorities written as long ago as 1915, 1930 and 1933,12
courts frequently have unblinkingly admitted chastity evi-
dence at trial without reassessing either materiality or rele-
vancy.? Such automatic admissibility has in some cases engen-
dered distorted relevancy standards. 4 Recently, however, the
admissibility of chastity evidence in all rape cases has been
persuasively challenged.
This challenge has focused on the materiality and rele-
vancy of chastity evidence. The mere existence of chastity evi-
dence does not satisfy materiality requirements. "The chastity
reputation of a complainant is not at issue in the sexual offense
case because the chaste condition of the complainant is not an
element of the offense. Rather, the reputation evidence is of-
fered to show consent or lack of credibility."2" To the extent of
exactly which elements are material, then, Wigmore and the
modern critics are in agreement. They diverge, however, on
whether chastity evidence is always relevant to prove these
material elements of consent and credibility.26
It has been argued that sexual character evidence is always
irrelevant.? A more qualified approach was taken in a recent
study of relevancy based on a statistical analysis of the average
female's sexual activities. " Relevancy was assessed in terms of
21 Id. at 466-67.
2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 924a at 740-46.
z See note 66 infra and cases cited therein.
2 E.g., in Adams v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W. 151 (Ky. 1927), evidence of prior
consensual sexual intercourse between the defendant and the complainant was held
to have been erroneously excluded, despite the fact that the defense was not consent,
but falsification of charges. This ruling contradicted the prevailing Kentucky practice
which admitted chastity evidence for substantive purposes only, not for impeachment
purposes. See note 66, infra and accompanying text.
Caulfield, The New Oregon Sexual Offenses Evidence Law: An Evaluation, 55
ORE. L. REv. 493, 510 (1976).
2 The respective views diverge also on whether credibility is always an issue in
rape cases. See notes 6-13 supra and accompanying text.
21 Washburn, Rape Law: The Need for Reform, 5 N.M. L. Rav. 279, 295-96 (1975).
1 Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again-A Legal Fallacy in Forci-
ble Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U. L. REV. 127 (1975). Psychological and sociological data
consulted for the purposes of this study include KINSEY, POMEROY, MARLIN & GEBHARD,
1977]
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the two issues considered to be material, consent and credibil-
ity. To the credibility issue, unchastity was said to be irrele-
vant because it has no logical connection with veracity2 and
because credibility can be impeached in other ways.30 As for the
consent issue, three classes of sexual activity were assessed for
relevancy: acts with the defendant short of intercourse, prior
intercourse with the defendant, and sexual activity with per-
sons other than the defendant. Acts in the first category were
termed irrelevant because of questionable statistical correla-
tions between petting and intercourse. 3' Prior acts of inter-
course with the defendant were deemed relevant to the consent
issue. 32 The third category of sexual activity was called irrele-
vant, for two reasons: First, statistics indicate that sexual ac-
tivity is far more widespread among females than it was in the
past; second, statistics on the emotional ties which generally
exist in sexual liaisons buttress the idea that sexual activity is
a function of choice.
3
However persuasive these arguments may initially appear,
one must cautiously scrutinize any attempt to list which evi-
dence is relevant and which is not. Relevant evidence has been
defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the exist-
ence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. ' 34 Thus the absence of any such connec-
tion would make evidence irrelevant. However, contentions
that other methods exist to prove the same fact, or that statisti-
cal correlations are imprecise, do not totally negate any
tendency which the evidence may have to make the fact to be
proved more or less probable. Some relevant evidence may not
be particularly convincing, and some relevant evidence may be
excluded for reasons which will be discussed below, 35 but it
must be remembered that evidence weighing even slightly
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953) and Reiss, How and Why America's Sex
Standards are Changing, SEXUAL DEVELOPMENTS AND BEHAVIOR (Juhasz ed. 1973).
Note, supra note 28, at 146-68.
Id. at 148. See also Caulfield, supra note 25, at 500-01.
" Note, supra note 28, at 143-44.
12 Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 137-43.
FED. R. EVID. 401.
15 See notes 37-40 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66
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upon a material fact is relevant. The very least connection
between the proffered evidence and the fact to be proved is
sufficient.
A second warning about "lists" of relevant evidence is in
order. One judge may declare an item of proof relevant,
whereas the same item would be termed irrelevant by another
judge. "There is no precise test of relevancy, but it is a determi-
nation which rests largely in the discretion of the trial court
... "36 Inasmuch as a "list" prescribes what items of proof
are universally relevant, it contradicts the notion that a rele-
vancy determination is reserved to judicial discretion on a case-
by-case basis.
Even if relevant, evidence may be deemed inadmissible
because it prejudices or confuses the jury, wastes time, or un-
fairly surprises a party.37 Character evidence is generally inad-
missible in any form, 3 for just these reasons. 9 According to
Wigmore, these "auxiliary policy reasons" are applicable only
to defendants, not to other witnesses." Thus, on historical pre-
cepts,4' evidence of rape complainants' prior sexual activity has
been admitted in rape cases.
Recently, however, arguments have been made that the
effects of admitting chastity evidence-in rape cases should be
considered.2 The overriding factors enumerated above, it has
been argued, are equally applicable to rape victims. Courts
have traditionally disregarded the humiliation and abuse suf-
fered by a rape victim from the act of rape itself throughout
trial.4 3 The plight of the rape victim has been recounted fre-
quently and graphically enough" that it need not be detailed
11 Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Ogden, 310 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Ky. 1958) (dictum).
3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, at § 42.
" Character may be proved by three types of evidence: prior acts, opinion and
reputation. Reputation generally is the preferred method. C. MCCORMICK, supra note
14, at § 186. For a description of the use of character evidence in rape cases, see
Comment, The Rape Victim: A Victim of Society and the Law, 11 WILLAMmr L.J.
36 (1974).
" C. MCCORMCK, supra note 14, at § 188.
J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, at § 62.
4, Wigmore cited cases decided in 1846, 1856 and 1895 to demonstrate his conclu-
sion that a woman's "character . . .as to chastity is of considerable probative value"
as evidence of consent or nonconsent. Id. (emphasis added).
,2 Washburn, supra note 27, at 296-300; Note, supra note 28, at 149-61.
3 See note 66 infra and cases cited therein.
11 Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and the Law, 61 CAL. L.
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here. Briefly, the victim typically is characterized as being on
trial herself45 and as being at the mercy of jurors' prejudices."
Due to these factors, and based on the high acquittal rates in
rape cases, rape has been characterized as the most underre-
ported crime.17 This undue humiliation and the resultant un-
derreporting of rape, critics have urged, mandate the exclusion
of chastity evidence in rape trials.
The most evident flaw in this argument is that the use of
chastity evidence in rape trials is not the sole cause of rape
victims' humiliation and their reluctance to report rapes.
Rather, these may be a function of the brutal violation of pri-
vacy which characterizes rape. Moreover, much of the embar-
rassment of which rape victims and their protectors have com-
plained has involved innuendoes by investigating policemen. 8
The use of chastity evidence at trial has, at most, a remote
causal relationship to such pretrial harrassment. More impor-
tantly, excluding chastity evidence from rape trials would not
by itself solve the problems of humiliation and underreporting
of rapes.
More persuasive is another argument against admitting
chastity evidence in rape trials, the contention that jurors'
prejudices affect the outcomes of rape trials.49 Admission of
REv. 919 (1973); Comment, Twice Traumatized: the Rape Victim and the Court, 58
JUDICATURE 391 (1975); Comment, supra note 38.
" The inequities of rape trials have prompted the observation that
[w]e have on one hand harsh penalties for rape; on the other, however, we
have few convictions and a myriad of laws and attitudes that tend to protect
men from conviction except when the complainant is a chaste, mentally
healthy woman who reports the attack promptly, and who is willing and able
to undergo the horrors of a rape trial.
Comment, Rape and Rape Laws, supra note 44, at 938. See also Note, supra note 28,
at 159-61.
w Bowman v. Commonwealth, 143 S.W. 47, 55 (Ky. 1912), reflects an oft-repeated
belief "that the very fact that the appellant is charged with the crime of rape places
him at a disadvantage." Such a notion was dispelled, however, by H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 193-218 (1966), where a study of American jurors indicated
exactly the reverse.
11 See Ky DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF STATE POLICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 12, 26 (1975). The Federal Bureau of Investigation
"estimates" that only one rape in five is reported. Lichtenstein, supra note 10, at 21,
col. 4.
See generally S.BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 364-66; D. RUSSELL, THE POuTICS
OF RAPE (1975) (poignant narratives by rape victims).
"g KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 46, at 149-59. Jurors are not the only persons who
have displayed biases in rape trials. Recent statements by at least one judge, implying
[Vol. 66
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evidence of a rape complainant's unchastity prompts some ju-
ries to find victim precipitation of rape and to manipulate rape
laws accordingly by incorporating the tort doctrine of assump-
tion of risk., Consequently, jurors will find defendants guilty
of a lesser crime if they can interpret the chastity evidence as
indicative of victim precipitation." "If forced to choose in these
cases between total acquittal and finding the defendant guilty
of rape, the jury will usually choose acquittal as the lesser
evil."5 2 Defense attorneys are well aware of the advantage
which a jury trial gives the rape defendant: Rarely is a jury trial
waived in rape cases. 3 Since jurors' prejudices can alter the
outcome of a case, this may be sufficient basis for excluding
some chastity evidence even if it is relevant. This argument is
discussed in greater detail in terms of the Kentucky rape shield
law.--
In brief, opponents of the use of chastity evidence in rape
trials have urged judges to find the evidence either not material
or not relevant. Alternatively, they have argued, such evidence
should be excluded because admitting it results in extreme
degradation to rape victims and in underreporting of rapes.
Exclusion of chastity evidence is additionally mandated, it has
been claimed, because jurors' decisions are significantly af-
fected by their prejudices regarding unchastity. It is against
this background that the clamor arose for reform of the rape
laws.
that skimpily dressed women get what they ask for when they are raped, indicate that
prejudices as to victim precipitation of rape are not confined to persons without legal
training. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1977, § A, at 9, col. 1; TIME, Sept. 12, 1977, at 41.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 46, at 249-54.
' Id. at 254.
-1 Id. This jury practice was reflected in Sanders v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d
208 (Ky. 1954). Intercourse was acknowledged and consent was the issue. On appeal,
the jury instruction on a lesser offense than rape was held erroneous, and the defen-
dant's conviction of the lesser charge was reversed.
m KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 46, at 29. Prosecutors, too, have observed the
effects of juror prejudices when evidence of unchastity is introduced. A recent study
"indicated that most prosecutors felt that admission of such evidence was a major
factor in jury deliberation. The impact was considerably reduced when cases were
considered by the Court alone." NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE, supra note 8, Prosecutors' Volume I at 27.
-1 See notes 94-96 infra and accompanying text.
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I. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: RAPE SHIELD LAWS
A. Generally
In response to advocates of rape law reform,5' state legisla-
tures have passed rape shield laws.36 More than thirty states
have passed such statutes.57 Generally, the laws" recognize
that a prior consensual act of sexual intercourse between a rape
victim and the defendant presents different considerations
under the law of evidence than such an act between a victim
and a third person. As a result, some of the laws admit only
victim-defendant chastity evidence. 51 Others prohibit victim-
third party chastity evidence unless it is relevant to an issue
injected into the case by the complainant: the complainant's
character, 0 or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease.6'
In addition to the above categorization of chastity evi-
dence, a majority of the laws require a hearing to determine the
admissibility of such evidence.12 Moreover, most of the statutes
specify the standard(s) by which admissibility is to be ascer-
tained . 3 Those statutes which establish this set of guidelines
generally require that the proof be material and relevant and
that its probative worth outweigh its inflammatory nature. 4
-1 The use of chastity evidence has not been the sole target for reform. See, e.g.,
Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 613
(1976).
"Rape shield law" is the designation popularly applied to statutes which limit
the use of evidence of a victim's chastity in rape trials. See generally Lichtenstein,
supra note 10.
Representative statutes include those cited in notes 59-62 infra. For a complete
list of laws passed as of January 1977, see Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation:
Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 32 nn.196, 197 (1977).
- The rape shield law of each state was analyzed by a student writer in December
1976. G. Robinson, Independent Study-Rape "Shield" Laws (Dec. 17, 1976) (unpub-
lished study at University of Louisville Law School, on file in Kentucky Law Journal
office). The examination includes a chart, which divides chastity evidence into two
essential categories: conduct with defendant and conduct with others. Each of these
kinds of evidence is then further examined for the following three characteristics:
admissibility; whether a hearing is required to determine admissibility; and what the
court must find to deem proffered evidence admissible. Moreover, this study includes
special features, if any, of the respective laws. Id. at Appendix.
" E.g., LA. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West Supp. 1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 632-A:1 through 632-A:7 (Supp. 1975).
60 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520 (j) (1974).
61 Id.
61 E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 510.145 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
63Id.
Id. "Inflammatory nature" is a typical characterization applied to evidence
COMMENTS
B. In Kentucky
The Kentucky rape shield law 5 was enacted in 1976. Be-
fore assessing its merit, it is helpful to understand the case law
which preceded it, the arguments advanced for and against it,
and the particulars of the law itself. The 1976 law renounced
almost a century of contrary decisions. Evidence of a rape com-
plainant's sexual activity prior to the alleged rape was pre-
viously admissible at trial as probative of the consent issue."
The evidence could be presented either in the form of reputa-
tion67 or specific acts.6 8
Those who lobbied for a legislative overruling of these deci-
sions argued that a shield law would protect rape victims from
unnecessary humiliation at trial;69 that "the basic issue in a
rape case should be consent, not a woman's past sex history;"70
that rape frequently went unreported because of rape victims'
dread of embarrassment; 71 and that the victim's sex history
should be excluded just as evidence of any rapes which the
defendant had previously committed.
72
which will tend to confuse, mislead or prejudice the jury.
"Id.
" Sanders v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d 208 (Ky. 1954); Grigsby v. Common-
wealth, 187 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1945); Bowman v. Commonwealth, 143 S.W. 47 (Ky.
1912). Although some courts distinguish between using chastity evidence for impeach-
ment purposes and using it as substantively probative of consent, Kentucky has never
employed the distinction. However, there is some language in Kentucky cases implying
that veracity is a function of chastity in females. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 157
S.W. 1079, 1080 (Ky. 1913); Lake v. Commonwealth, 104 S.W. 1003, 1006 (Ky. 1907).
These cases, as well as those cited by Wigmore, reflect 19th-century notions of female
chastity. At any rate, the distinction may be academic in rape cases, wherein the issues
of credibility and consent are functionally equivalent. J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, §
62 at 467. For a suggestion that using chastity evidence to impeach females, while
disallowing its use to impeach males, is a denial of equal protection, see Comment,
Rape in Illinois: A Denial of Equal Protection, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 457 (1975).
" Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 187 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1945); Lake v. Commonwealth,
104 S.W. 1003 (Ky. 1907).
11 Gravitt v. Commonwealth, 212 S.W. 430 (Ky. 1919); Brown v. Commonwealth,
43 S.W. 214 (Ky. 1897).
,1 The Courier-Journal (Louisville, Kentucky), June 10, 1975, § A, at 9, col. 1. See
also notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
70 Interim Comm. on the Judiciary, Minutes 1 (June 19, 1975) (on file in Legisla-
tive Research Comm'n Library, Kentucky State Capitol).
11 Hearings on 76 B.R. 28 Before the Interim Comm. on the Judiciary (June 19,
1975) (statement of Barbara Levinson, Chairperson for the Citizens' Advisory Task
Force on Rape, et al.) (tape recording on file at Legislative Research Comm'n, Ken-
tucky State Capitol).
n The Courier-Journal (Louisville, Kentucky), supra note 69.
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The deficiencies in the arguments regarding humiliation
and underreporting were discussed earlier.3 It is the final argu-
ment of those above, however, which is most troubling. Evi-
dence of previous rape convictions is admissible against the
defendant in a rape case, as an exception to the general prohi-
bition against admitting evidence of previous crimes commit-
ted by the defendant.74 The theory underlying this exception is
that sex offenders are likely to repeat their crimes.
75
In opposition to the proposed bill, it was argued that prior
sexual activity is relevant when consent is a defense; 7 that the
danger of false allegations is prevalent in rape cases;77 and that
the proposed rape shield law was unconstitutional because it
"seriously diminishes an accused's right to cross-examine the
prosecution's prime witness and his right to present witnesses
on his own behalf.' '78 The humiliation of the rape victim, it was
contended, must yield to a paramount consideration: That
"only one person is on trial in a rape case and only one person
can be imprisoned-the defendant.
'79
Kentucky Revised Statutes § 510.145 (the Kentucky rape
shield law) creates a blanket exclusion of chastity evidence, in
the form of either reputation or specific acts,80 at rape trials."
Carved from this exclusion are two categories of evidence which
may be deemed admissible: (1) "evidence of the complaining
witness' prior sexual conduct or habits with the defendant"8
11 See note 43-48 supra and accompanying text.
71 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at § 43.
" But see Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as Evidence
in Prosecutions for Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIz. L. Rxv. 212 (1965).
71 Aprile, Bill Aimed at Protecting Rape Victim Could Deprive Defendant of Fair
Trial, The Louisville Times, July 10, 1975, § A, at 15, col. 1.
" Id. at col. 3.
Id. at col. 1.
7' Id. See notes 110-24 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the consti-
tutionality of Kentucky's rape shield statute.
KRS § 510.145(2) (Supp. 1976). A Senate Committee amendment would have
limited the scope of this prohibition to evidence of prior acts only. The amendment,
however, was withdrawn before it was votbd on by the Senate. 1976 JoURNAL OF THE
SENATE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 1394 (Mar. 17,
1976).
" This exclusion also extends to prosecutions under KRS §§ 510.040-.140 (1975)
for sodomy, sexual abuse and sexual misconduct and "for assault with intent to com-
mit, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit" either of those crimes. KRS §
510.145(2) (Supp. 1976).
12 KRS § 510.145(3) (Supp. 1976). The opponents of H.B. 143 sponsored an
amendment which would have allowed the judge to hear evidence of all sexual activity
[Vol. 66
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and (2) "evidence directly pertaining to the act on which the
prosecution is based."83 Admissibility of either is contingent
upon the defendant's filing a written motion with the court, 4
and the judge's determination at a subsequent hearing that the
proffered evidence is relevant and material and "that its proba-
tive value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature." 5
III[. THE KENTUCKY RAPE SHIELD LAW: AN EvALUATION
The Kentucky rape shield law recognizes that separate
standards should apply to admissibility of evidence of a vic-
tim's prior consensual sexual activity and admissibility of evi-
dence of forcible rapes of which the defendant has previously
been convicted. The most visible merit of the law is that it
treats chastity evidence as ordinary character evidence and
reminds judges that the evidence should be evaluated in terms
of ordinary admissibility standards. In addition to these val-
ues, the Kentucky rape shield law has certain deficiencies. It
allows some chastity evidence to be wrongly excluded. In those
instances, the law violates the sixth amendment rights of the
defendant. In effect, then, the Kentucky rape shield law is an
unbalanced consideration of the interests of the victim and the
defendant.
of the complainant prior to the alleged rape, before deciding which portions were
admissible at trial. The Courier-Journal (Louisville, Kentucky), Jan. 24, 1976, § A, at
5, col. 1. Specifically, the amendment proposed to "delete [the] condition of evidence
of prior sexual conduct with the defendant, making evidence of any such prior conduct
admissable [sic]." 12 LEGISLATIVE RECORD 63 (Apr. 5, 1976). The amendment, how-
ever, was defeated. Id.
KRS § 510.145(3) (Supp. 1976). See also notes 104-05 infra and accompanying
text.
4 KRS § 510.145(3)(a) (Supp. 1976). The motion must state that the defendant
has "relevant evidence of prior sexual conduct or habits of the complaining witness."
Id.
The motion must be filed at least two days before trial, unless the defendant
shows good cause for abrogating this requirement. Id. As proposed, this period was
two weeks, 76 B.R. 28. The change to two days was the result of an amendment pro-
posed by the House Committee on the Judiciary and adopted on the floor of the House.
1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF KENTUCKY
116 (Jan. 23, 1976).
As KRS § 510.145(3)(b) (Supp. 1976). The evidence, if determined admissible, may
be admitted in whole or in part, "in accordance with the applicable rules of evidence."
Id.
1977]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
A. In Terms of Evidence Admissibility Standards
The Kentucky rape shield law demonstrates that evidence
of a victim's previous sexual activity is not comparable to evi-
dence of rapes of which the defendant has been convicted. The
evidence offered by each side in a rape trial is distinct: The
prosecution attempts to prove the defendant's tendency to
commit unlawful, forcible sexual intercourse, while the defense
attempts to prove the complainant's tendency to have
consensual sexual intercourse with the defendant. This distinc-
tion is ignored by persons who argue that rape shield laws keep
out certain evidence which is in the defendant's favor while
allowing in the same evidence to be used against the defendant.
Quite simply, it is not the same evidence at all.
Rape shield laws, on the other hand, point out the distinc-
tion between consensual sexual intercourse and forced sexual
intercourse by demanding scrutiny of evidence of the former on
separate standards from evidence of the latter. Evidence of
forced sexual intercourse (earlier rape convictions) is admitted
because of notions that rapists tend to repeat their crimes. 8 No
such recurrent tendency has been demonstrated with respect to
evidence of consensual sexual intercourse (chastity evidence).
Absent any such proof, courts should apply established admis-
sibility rules to chastity evidence. Rape shield laws require
exactly that.
A second merit of the Kentucky rape shield law is that it
serves a* memory-jogging function: It reminds judges that
chastity evidence is ordinary character evidence, to which ordi-
nary admissibility rules should apply. Having repudiated the
notions which made chastity evidence mechanically admissible
as relevant to consent, 7 the Kentucky legislature has rein-
stated chastity evidence into the category of character evi-
dence.8 1 Since the use of such evidence rests upon the theory
that traits control a person's behavior, 9 evidence admitted in
8' See notes 74-75 supra and accompanying text.
87 Kentucky has never allowed the use of chastity evidence to impeach a witness's
credibility. See note 66 supra and cases cited therein.
11 The Federal Rules of Evidence, in contrast, retain the distinction between
chastity evidence and other character evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 404. The logic
underlying this rule has been attacked; see Washburn, supra note 27, at 296-300.
8' Wigmore admitted that character evidence is "a feeble and petty class of evi-
dence," and pointed out a modern trend to "abandon the old notion (a mark of a
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a rape case where the defense is consent should tend to prove
(1) the propensity of the complainant to engage in a pattern of
indiscriminate sexual conduct;" (2) the propensity of the com-
plainant to have sexual intercourse with persons similar to the
defendant, under similar circumstances; or (3) the propensity
of the complainant to have sexual intercourse with the defen-
dant himself. Of these three facts to be proved, the Kentucky
rape shield law permits only evidence of the last, because of its
blanket exclusion of evidence of sexual acts with any person
other than the defendant. Evidence of sexual activity between
the victim and persons other than the defendant does introduce
additional issues into the trial, thereby confusing the jury to-a
degree. In some cases exclusion of such evidence is justifiable,
since the prejudicial, confusing or misleading nature of chastity
evidence frequently outweighs its probative worth.' Yet the
Kentucky law does wrongly exclude some evidence even when
its probative worth outweighs its inflammatory nature. This
criticism is discussed below. However, when chastity evidence
is rightfully excluded, the most obvious merit of the Kentucky
rape shield law is demonstrated: It applies established admissi-
bility rules to chastity evidence just as to other character evi-
dence.
To the extent that the Kentucky rape shield law reminds
the courts that the concepts of relevancy, materiality and
undue prejudice or confusion of issues apply to chastity evi-
dence, it is fully defensible. Particularly important is the appli-
cation of the concept of issue confusion. Several reasons man-
primitive stage of opinion) that a usually bad man will usually lie and a usually good
man will usually tell the truth." J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 922 at 724. For an analysis
of the disparities among legal treatment, cultural perceptions and psychological data
regarding character traits, see Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look
at an Interminable Problem, 50 NomE DAME LAw. 758 (1975). Despite indications that
legal treatment of character evidence reflects outdated psychological theories, the use
of character evidence to prove conformity with character traits nonetheless persists.
30 A model rape shield law has been proposed which would require admissibility
of chastity evidence to be based on, in addition to basic evidence law principles, a
finding by the court that the evidence "shows such a relation to the conduct involved
in the case that it tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of C
the prosecutrix that is relevant to the issue of consent." G. Robinson, supra note 58, t
at 13. In addition, two states' rape shield laws embody this "pattern of conduct"
notion. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2445
(Supp. 1975).
" See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
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date exclusion of evidence despite its relevance. As enunciated
by Wigmore, those reasons are confusion of issues, unfair sur-
prise and undue prejudice. 2 According to the Federal Rules of
Evidence: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . .,.
Thus the concerns which exclude certain relevant evidence are
not limited to evidence which will prejudice a jury against a
defendant. The evil feared is, on a larger scale, that a wrong
result will occur because the jury is confused or misled. 4
Viewing these exclusionary reasons from a broader
perspective helps to answer one of the arguments generally
advanced by opponents of rape shield laws: that the humilia-
tion to which a rape victim is subjected at trial is of no legal
consequence because humiliation is not the equivalent of
undue prejudice. Undue prejudice, it is urged, is a concept
properly applied only to situations in which the defendant may
be prejudiced.95 It must be emphasized, however, that issue
confusion and misleading the jury are of equal importance with
undue prejudice. In light of recent jury studies which demon-
strate significant juror confusion because of chastity evidence,96
the legally significant reason for which chastity evidence
should sometimes be excluded is not that rape victims suffer
humiliation, but that chastity evidence confuses the jury and
makes jurors reach incorrect decisions or, at any rate, decisions
based on faulty reasoning. Therefore, by excluding relevant
chastity evidence when it tends to confuse or mislead jurors,
the Kentucky rape shield law properly applies admissibility
standards of evidence law.
Problems arise, however, when the Kentucky statute de-
fines as unduly confusing or misleading all evidence of victim-
third party sexual intercourse. Almost all of the rape shield
laws attempt to give courts examples of unduly confusing or
misleading evidence. The typical act has been characterized as
92 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 42.
" FED. R. EVID. 403.
"1 "'Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."
FED. R. EVID. 403 (Advisory Comm.'s Note).
"5 See J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 921; J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 62.
" See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.
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an exclusion of chastity evidence, with express exemptions. 7
Any attempt to list relevant chastity evidence and to distin-
guish between that portion which is unduly confusing or mis-
leading and that which should be admissible creates the very
problem faced by the typical rape shield law - balancing the
needs of the complainant with the rights of the defendant.
Moreover, no statutory scheme can anticipate all situations
which will arise in the courtroom context. However, some illus-
trations are in order at this juncture.
Examples of issues to which chastity evidence may be rele-
vant98 include (1) chastity per se;99 (2) motive of the complain-
ant in charging the defendant with rape;'0 (3) a result of the
act itself such as disease or pregnancy; 01 and (4) consent. The
Kentucky law's absolute prohibition on victim-third party sex-
ual activity clearly disallows use of such evidence to impeach
a witness who proclaims herself chaste.' 2 In addition, the de-
nial of such evidence precludes using proof of a victim-third
person sexual liaison to establish a complainant's bias against
a defendant.'0 3 As for the third example, the Kentucky legisla-
ture presumably had such evidence in mind when it deemed
admissible "evidence directly pertaining to the act on which
the prosecution is based."'0 4 However, "if broadly interpreted
the clause could negate the whole purpose of the statute."''0
The first three examples thus point out deficiencies in the
Kentucky rape shield law. In those cases, relevant evidence is
" Berger, supra note 57, at 32-39.
" "The term 'relevant' as applied to evidence means that the evidence tends to
establish or disprove an issue in litigation." O'Bryan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 413
S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1966). The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EvD. 401.
1 Chastity would be at issue in a rape case if the applicable statute defined rape
as "unlawful carnal intercourse with any unmarried person, of previous chaste charac-
ter ... " FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05 (West 1976).
' Bias of a witness may be established to impeach her credibility. C. McCoRMICK,
supra note 14, § 40.
,o See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
,02 After a witness has put her own character in issue, it may be attacked by the
defense. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 14, § 187.
10 See note 24 supra.
10, KRS § 510.145(3) (Supp. 1976).
"D G. Robinson, supra note 58, at 5.
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excluded although it is not unduly prejudicial. In each con-
text, the need for the evidence and the unfair advantage en-
joyed by the prosecution if it is excluded mandate its admissi-
bility.
The fourth example, in contrast, was chosen to illustrate
a strength of the Kentucky law: the memory-jogging function
as to relevancy and materiality. Judges must be reminded that
consent should truly be an issue in the case before evidence can
be admitted as probative of consent.' °' Consent may be elimi-
nated as an issue in the case, for example, if the defendant
illegally entered the complainant's home or used force on the
complainant;' 7 if the defense is that no intercourse occurred;' 8
or if consent is disallowed as a defense.' 9 When consent is
eliminated as an issue, the evidence should not be admitted.
B. In Terms of the Sixth Amendment
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment"0 also
demands that certain considerations be weighed in determin-
ing whether relevant and material evidence is to be excluded.
The importance of the use for which the evidence is desired
must be balanced against the interest which the state has in
excluding such evidence, together with alternative ways which
can protect the same interest in the particular situation."' This
analysis was applied by the United States Supreme Court in
Davis v. Alaska,"2 in which, in assessing the use of a statute
which shielded a juvenile offender's identity in light of the need
to prove bias on the part of a witness, the Court held:
The State's policy interest in protecting the confidential-
ity of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of
106 See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
"o State v. Geer, 533 P.2d 389 (Wash. App. 1975).
lO State v. Sims, 517 P.2d 1315 (Utah 1974).
'0, DeLawder v. Warden, Md. House of Correction, 328 A.2d 76 (Md. App. 1974).
10 The right of a criminal defendant "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him" includes the right of cross-examination. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Similarly, the Kentucky Constitution provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused has the right. . . to meet the witnesses face to face
. ... Ky. CONST. § 11.
"I Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). For a different interpretation of the Davis
analysis, see Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the Confrontation
Clause?, 9 IND. L. REv. 418 (1976).
112 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-
examination for bias of an adverse witness. The State could
have protected Green from exposure of his juvenile adjudica-
tion in these circumstances by refraining from using him to
make out its case; the State cannot, consistent with the right
of confrontation, require the petitioner to bear the full burden
of vindicating the State's interest in the secrecy of juvenile
criminal records."' 3
Weighing the importance of the use of the evidence prof-
fered against the state interests protected by a rape shield law
is essentially the same exercise as measuring the probative
worth of evidence against the likelihood that it will confuse or
mislead jurors if it is admitted. Therefore, the sixth amend-
ment analysis and the resultant deficiencies of the Kentucky
rape shield law are fundamentally the same as the analysis and
deficiencies discussed in the preceding section of this Com-
ment.
Two variations occur, however, in evaluating a rape shield
law in terms of the sixth amendment. The first difference is
that the constitutional analysis can properly include the hu-
miliation suffered by rape victims at trial, and their resultant
failure to report rapes, as legitimate state interests. As indi-
cated earlier, these are not true legal concerns in an evidence
admissibility analysis."' Thus the case for excluding chastity
evidence is stronger when viewed in terms of the sixth amend-
ment than when assessed in terms of evidence admissiblity
standards.
The second distinction between the two analyses is that
the constitutional test injects an element not present in the
evidence admissibility test: alternative ways in which the state
can protect the same interest in the same situation. Since the
variable factor in the analysis-importance of the use for which
the evidence is offered-cannot be anticipated, any attempt to
list alternatives would be futile. Compulsory waiver of jury
trial in rape cases, besides being unconstitutional,' 5 is not an
alternative because it would make rape defendants bear too
,, Id. at 320.
" See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 43-48 supra and
accompanying text.
,, U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Ky. CONST. § 11.
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much of the burden of preserving the state's interest. Such an
undue burden was condemned by the court in Davis.
Finally, the Davis analysis does not require the absolute
eradication of a shield law when it is found to violate the sixth
amendment. Rather, the shield statute in Davis was recognized
as a valid legislative declaration of public policy which was
forced to yield in the face of a more compelling policy; the
statute was merely held inapplicable because it conflicted with
the sixth amendment in that particular case, instead of being
ruled unconstitutional."' Thus, the constitutionality of a rape
shield law should depend upon the proposed use of evidence
which the statute would otherwise exclude. Only when the
importance of that use outweighs the state interests in applying
the rape shield law should the law be made to yield.
As for the Kentucky law, some situations readily come to
mind in which the statute will have to yield in the face of the
more compelling policy evinced by the sixth amendment. The
Kentucky rape shield law will have to yield to the sixth amend-
ment if a complaining witness proclaims herself chaste; if evi-
dence of some victim-third person sexual liaison exists which
tends to prove a victim's bias against a defendant; or if a defen-
dant seeks to prove that someone else is responsible for a conse-
quence of the act, such as pregnancy or disease.1 17 In these
contexts, the sixth amendment mandates admissiblity of evi-
dence of sexual activity between the victim and a third party.
C. In Terms of a Proposed Model
"The problem is to chart a course between inflexible legis-
lative rules and wholly untrammeled judicial discretion: The
former threatens the rights of defendants; the latter may ignore
the needs of complainants.""' 8 Kentucky's law is dangerously
close to an inflexible legislative rule, since the only exemptions
"I A concurring opinion in Davis emphasized that constitutionality of a shield
statute will vary with the proposed use of the evidence which would otherwise be
excluded. Justice Stewart stated that "the Court neither holds nor suggests that the
Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the general credibility of a witness
through cross-examination about his past delinquency adjudications or criminal con-
victions." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 321 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring).
"I See State v. DeLawder, 344 A.2d 446 (Md. App. 1975). See also notes 98-105
supra and accompanying text.
"I Berger, supra note 57, at 69.
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from its ban on chastity evidence are prior victim-defendant
sexual conduct"' and "evidence directly pertaining to the act
on which the prosecution is based." ' As explained previously,
those two categories of proof are insufficient to protect the
rights of defendants under evidence admissibility standards
and under the sixth amendment. The Kentucky rape shield law
thus expresses a clear preference for the needs of complainants,
with no concomitant concern for the rights of defendants.
However extreme the maltreatment of rape victims, the
Kentucky rape shield law should not go to the other exteme by
evincing a preference for victims and a prejudice against defen-
dants. An argument that the Davis analysis will protect defen-
dants' rights in the proper situations is not persuasive. A law
which manifests a bias against criminal defendants runs
counter to our system of criminal justice, which utilizes the
presumption of innocence.
Some state legislatures have attempted to provide a bal-
anced approach in the language of their rape shield laws. The
key in finding that balance is to ascertain that "the categories
of proof outside the act's automatic ban [on chastity evi-
dence] are sufficiently inclusive to meet the rightful demands
of defendants . . 11 Accordingly, a model statute which
purports to establish the desired balance has recently been
proposed.'2
The proposed statute does not contain the deficiencies
which lie in the Kentucky rape shield law. For example, it
would admit evidence tending to prove a rape victim's bias
against the defendant,'23 as well as evidence of a pattern of
conduct which manifests a tendency to consent to intercourse
with the defendant.'l On balance, the proposed law does what
the Kentucky rape shield law fails to do: It recognizes the need
for rape shield laws, while protecting the constitutional rights
of defendants in rape cases.
"' KRS § 510.145(3) (Supp. 1976).
'' Id.
222 Berger, supra note 57, at 72.
2 Id. at 97-99.
' Id.
IN Id.
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CONCLUSION
Although rape shield laws have been attacked as a legisla-
tive invasion of the province of the judiciary,'25 a re-evaluation
of the crumbling legal and psychological foundations support-
ing the admissibility of chastity evidence at rape trials was
clearly in order. As reminders of elementary evidence princi-
ples, then, rape shield laws perform a vital task. The courts
have been informed that chastity evidence should be shorn of
its uniqueness based on outmoded beliefs and evaluated merely
as character evidence.
Recognizing that consensual sexual intercourse and forced
intercourse are entirely separate occurrences, legislatures have
passed rape shield laws to establish standards of admissibility
of evidence of intercourse by consent. In essence, rape shield
laws apply to chastity evidence the same admissibility stan-
dards of relevancy, materiality and issue confusion by which
other proffered evidence is evaluated.
Clearly, then, Kentucky's rape shield law possesses the
general attributes of all rape shield laws. Beyond this point,
however, two deficiencies are apparent in the Kentucky stat-
ute. First, it excludes some relevant chastity evidence, the need
for which outweighs its tendency to confuse or mislead jurors.
Secondly, the law manifests an unequivocal preference for rape
victims over defendants. Although a defendant's constitutional
right to confrontation can be preserved by making the Ken-
tucky rape shield law yield in particular situations, defendants
should not be required to surrender their rights as the price of
previous judicial bias against rape victims.
Judges have traditionally assessed evidence to determine
relevancy and probative worth. Although they have not pre-
viously applied these standards to chastity evidence, it should
be sufficient for legislatures to provide, via rape shield laws, a
reminder that such standards should apply and should provide
examples to guide the judiciary applying these standards.'28
125 Comment, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the
Prior Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection
of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HoFsTRA L. Rv. 403 (1975).
2I Language in some recent cases indicates careful reappraisals of the relevance,
materiality and probative worth of chastity evidence. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pope v.
Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946 (Ariz. 1976); People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 123
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The legislature should not go so far, however, as to enact a law
which is biased against defendants. The Kentucky rape shield
law transcends this boundary, and its infirmity should be cor-
rected. 2 7
Jennifer Burcham Coffman
Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975); In re J.W.Y., 363 A.2d 674 (D.C. App. 1976); State v. Howard,
544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975).
I" For another criticism of the Kentucky rape shield law, see Memorandum from
J. Vincent Aprile II, Chief, Appellate Branch, Office of Public Defender of Kentucky
(undated) (on file at Kentucky Law Journal office).
